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Abstract
Recent evidence suggests that labeling of unconditional cash transfers leads recip-
ients to spend more on the labeled good. In this paper we show that the Winter
Fuel Payment, an unconditional cash transfer, has distortionary effects on the market
for goods related to the labeled product, renewable technologies. Using a Regression
Discontinuity Design this analysis finds a robust reduction in the probability to install
renewable energy technologies of 1.2 percentage points. Falsification tests support
the labeling hypothesis. As a result, households use too much energy from sources
which generate pollution and too little from relatively cleaner technologies.
JEL Classification: C31, Q42, Q48
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1 Introduction
Many governments have started to incorporate the lessons of behavioral economics
in their policies. These behavioral interventions (or “nudges”) are characterized by
their non-pecuniary nature, including appeals to social norms, information provision,
default options, and cash transfer labels (e.g., Schultz et al., 2007; Homonoff, 2013;
Allcott, 2011; Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010; Ferraro and Price, 2013). The attrac-
tiveness of these interventions lies in the fact that they are simple and often inexpen-
sive to implement, but at the same time produce considerable changes in behavior.
Nudges have been found to be successful in a variety of settings, improving healthy
and pro-social behaviors (e.g., Giné et al., 2010; Breman, 2011; Schultz et al., 2008),
adoption of better technologies (Duflo et al., 2011), saving rates (e.g., Madrian and
Shea, 2001; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Chetty et al., 2009; Chetty et al., 2012) and
energy efficiency and use (e.g., Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Ayres et al., 2013; Jessoe
and Rapson, 2014; Reiss and White, 2008; Brown et al., 2013).
Among these interventions, labeling manipulations have attracted the attention
of social scientists and economists in recent years (see, e.g., Newell and Siikamäki,
2014; Swartz et al., 2011; Mathios, 2000; Fischer, 2008; Kallbekken et al., 2013).
Labels are often attached to cash transfers that, although unconditional to any spe-
cific use, are given a suggestive name with the intention to nudge recipients into
socially desirable behaviors or to provide further information to consumers. Exam-
ple of these types are the child tax credit in the US or child benefits in the UK. The
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literature typically studies the effectiveness of the label in promoting such desired be-
haviors and stress that standard economics would predict unconditional labeled cash
transfers to be equivalent to an unconditional unlabeled cash transfers.1 However,
recent evidence suggests that labeled transfers seem to be spent more than propor-
tionally on the items suggested by the label (e.g., Beatty and Tuttle, 2015; Kooreman,
2000; Beatty et al., 2014; Blow et al., 2012).
This paper is different in that it asks whether labels may alter decisions on prod-
ucts related to the labeled good. The theory which underlies the disproportional
impact of the label on the labeled good is mental accounting (Thaler, 1990).Mental
accounting argues that households assign their income to categories of expenditure,
thus when income is received that is labeled, it is disproportionately assigned into
the labeled category. However it is unclear how individuals make “accounts” in their
head and thus which goods the label impacts become an empirical question. Even in
the case that it is clear that the account includes the goods in question, how related
goods are impacted depend on the magnitude of counteracting income and substi-
tution effects. The literature cited above classifies the labeling effect as encourag-
ing behavior that policymakers would like to occur although labeling coudl be used
for other purposes like agenda setting. Should the effect of the label “spillover” to
decision on other goods, it becomes less clear that these altered behaviors are the
decisions policymakers would like to encourage.
The UK Winter Fuel Payment (WFP) is an unconditional cash transfer into an
1Both of these types of transfers are uncommon with conditional cash transfers being most common,
like Medicaid in the US and unemployment benefits in the UK.
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individuals current/checking account designed to combat the excess elderly winter
mortality and morbidity associated with cold indoor climates. It provides house-
holds, which have a member 60 years of age (or older) in the qualifying week of a
given year, with a lump sum annual payment. A person who turns 60 in a given
year, but after the qualifying week, does not receives the payment. The WFP is not
means tested nor is it mandated that the payment be spent on fuel. Though the WFP
transfers cash that could be utilized for any expenditure, the label of the transfer
induces households to use a larger portion of it to pay their energy bills than a non-
labeled transfer (Beatty et al., 2014). The rationale for this behavior is based on the
framework of mental accounting. We interpret the theory that labeled income being
assigned to a category as implying that households treat the WFP like a reduction
in the price of energy. This affects directly the amount of money spent for fuel and
can have indirect effects on substitute goods too. For instance, perceived lower price
of energy might induce households to substitute away from more energy efficient
technologies or renewables. While renewables are different than energy efficiency
measures, and renewables are sometimes installed for different reasons (Andor et al.,
2017), they have the potential to achieve the same goal set by the WFP, i.e., keeping
elderly warm in winter, while also reducing the negative externalities from emis-
sions. Our analysis shows that the WFP label has the unintended consequence of
reducing the propensity to install renewable technologies.2
The identification strategy is based on the sharp eligibility criteria of the WFP
2Another notable example of counterproductive labels is Cialdini (2003).
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which allows for an estimation of the casual impact of the WFP on the propensity to
install renewable energy with a regression discontinuity design (RDD). 3 This anal-
ysis uses repeated cross-sections to compare thousand of households who are born
just before or after a qualifying week in each year from 2008 to 2011. The iden-
tifying assumption here is that these households born few months apart are similar
in their observed and unobserved characteristics and would have behaved similarly
with respect to investing in renewable technology in the absence of the WFP. In other
words, this assumption ensures that non-recipients represent a valid counterfactual
to recipients near the discontinuity point (i.e., local randomization assumption).
Valid RDD estimation requires that other potential explanatory variables that af-
fect the outcome are continuous around the treatment discontinuity point (see, e.g.,
Hahn et al., 2001 and Lee and Lemieux, 2010). We note that since WFP eligibility
occurs around the same age as pension eligibility for females, there is the potential
for a discontinuity in retirement for females to confound the effect of the WFP on
propensity to install renewables.4 Additionally, the decision-making process con-
cerning renewable technologies may not rest with the older members of the house-
hold if they rent their home (instead of owing) and/or contain more than two adults
(e.g., older person living with their own children). To ensure that the results obtained
from the RDD estimation identify the effect of the WFP, and not one of the issues dis-
cussed above, we restrict the sample to homeowners, living in a household composed
3For recent reviews of the RDD in economics and social sciences see Imbens and Wooldridge (2008);
DiNardo and Lee (2011); Van der Klaauw (2008).
4Indeed, tests of discontinuity in employment for females show a large and statistically significant de-
crease in employment at 60 years of age in the qualifying week.
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by maximum two members in which the oldest is a male (whose pension eligibility
age is 65). 5 Outside of these identification concerns, RDD estimates are sensitive to
the choice of bandwidth size (the window on either side of the cut off) and functional
form. For this reason, we present estimates from various combinations of different
bandwidths (6, 8 and 10) and functional forms (linear, quadratic and cubic) in a para-
metric estimation and different bandwidths (6, 3, 2) in a non-parametric estimation.
Results consistently find a negative effect of the WFP on the probability to in-
stall renewables. Parametric models with optimal functional forms, as established
by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), show that the probability of installing re-
newables decreases by 1.2 percentage points for WFP recipients (from a baseline of
1.6 %. This drop corresponds to about 69% of households substituting away from
renewable investments after receiving the payment (i.e., more than half of house-
holds who would have installed renewables are “discouraged” to do so just after
receiving the payment).6 Given the universality of the WFP this is a considerable
distortion, however the impact seems to dissipate as the oldest person gains in age.
Non-parametric models and parametric models with those of age 60 removed, known
as the “doughnut hole” model, find a negative and statistically significant drop in re-
newable installation also. Additionally, placebo WFP eligibility ages other than 60
do not find statistically significant changes in the propensity to install renewables.
Other falsification tests show that the WFP has no effect on the probability to in-
5Though this makes our result more like an average treatment effect on the treated given that the sub-
sample is the one most likely to be impacted by the treatment.
6This is computed by taking the difference between portion of households predicted to have installed
renewables with and without receiving the WFP at the cut off.
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vest in one’s home through other large items, such as remodeling their kitchen, and
that extra income that is not labeled does not effect the probability of installing re-
newables. Finally, we show that adding loft insulation (the most common energy
efficiency improvement) is not affected by the WFP and it is argued that this is due
to the plethora of programs by local governments and utilities to encourage loft in-
sulation installation.
This analysis is the first to estimate the indirect effects of a labeled cash transfer
payment by looking at the potential distortionary effects on related goods. These
indirect effects are especially important in energy issues, in which negative exter-
nalities are pervasive and policies that seems at first effective, may ultimately lead to
socially inefficient outcomes. We find that households are nudged away from sources
which generate relatively cleaner energy. In other words, a distortionary effect on the
renewable market is not a necessary evil to achieve the public health objective of re-
ducing cold-related mortality and morbidity. The label can be changed such that it
promotes harmony between health and energy policy. The impact of the WFP label
on renewable energy investment is particularly concerning given current UK energy
policy. The UK Committee on Climate Change (CCC) has outlined ambitious goals
for improved household energy efficiency and uptake of renewable energy technolo-
gies. The scenario envisioned by the CCC for the UK to meet their carbon budgets
requires substantial savings from the building sector. As a result of these climate
change-driven energy goals, increased concern over the security of energy supplies
and competitiveness of the UK economy, a number of high profile energy saving
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policies have been implemented in the last 5 years. Many target the residential sec-
tor, such as the Green Deal and Feed-in Tariff Scheme. These policies are designed to
make it easier for citizens to recognize the future benefits of energy efficient choices
and reduce the upfront cost of installing energy efficient and/or renewable technolo-
gies (Jaraite et al., 2017). The research here reveals that the WFP label does not fully
support the UK goal of carbon emissions reductions, with the caveat that reducing
excess winter mortality is also a goal. When it comes to unconditional transfers,
labels should take into account indirect effects to avoid potential unintended conse-
quences and lead behaviors towards more socially efficient outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a
conceptual framework on the relationship between the WFP and household’s instal-
lation of renewable energy. Section three describes the data, while Section four de-
tails the empirical strategy. Sections five discusses the results, associated robustness
checks and provides some support of the labeling channel. Section six concludes the
study.
2 Background
The WFP was initiated in 1997 by the UK government as a means to reduce ex-
cess winter morbidity and mortality in the elderly. At the time, the UK had one of
the highest rates of winter mortality in Europe. Initially the payment was £20 per
household, but in 2001 it increased to £200, and, for 60 to 79 years old, it has stayed
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at that level since then, although for in the period 2008-2010 it included extra one-
time payments of £507 Households who have a member who is 60 or older at the
beginning of the qualifying week are eligible to receive the WFP.8 Households who
have not previously registered with the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP),
the agency that manages the WFP, have to fill out a form to receive the payment.
Those that have previously registered will automatically receive the payment. Al-
most all the qualified households do indeed receive the payment.9 Once a household
is in receipt of the WFP, it continues to be paid until the DWP is notified of a change
in circumstance that makes the household no longer eligible for the payment. The
placement of the qualifying week has changed over time, however during the years
in our data the qualifying week came in September. The payment is generally direct
deposited into the eligible person’s checking account in November and a letter is sent
to them beforehand which states that they will be receiving the WFP. 10 Important for
this analysis is that the WFP is not means tested and all households which contain a
member 60 or above at the qualifying week receive the payment.11
A simple model where the household produces energy services (e.g., heating)
7For a detail year-by-year change of rates, criteria and constant update on the WFP, please consult
the full report by Steven Kennedy at the House of Commons Library available online at researchbrief-
ings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06019.
8Additionally, the UK Government provides the Cold Weather Payment of £25 to low income house-
holds if the temperature in their area of residence is subzero for seven consecutive days. Our analysis does
not include this payment. Given the small amount, our use of survey year dummies, and different eligibility
criteria this will not confound our analysis.
9Beatty et al. (2014) cites a 90% take up rate. Using self-reported data from the English Housing Survey
this becomes 98% for the period of interest.
10To the best of our knowledge, no further information or suggestions are given about how a household
should spend the money.
11This aspect of the WFP has proved quite controversial as many fuel poverty and austerity groups argue
that the WFP should be altered to help the fuel poor exclusively.
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through the use of energy (e.g., electricity) and capital (e.g., renewable technologies)
is utilized to show how the WFP could affect household decisions around renewable
energy technologies. It is assumed that the household maximizes the production of
energy services subject to a budget constraint.12 The household’s production of en-
ergy services is assumed to follow a Cobb-Douglas production function and can be
modeled using isoquant and isocost curves, which show the household’s ability to
purchase energy or capital constrained by total expenditure.13 In this setting, higher
levels of capital imply lower levels of energy used for a given level of energy ser-
vices. Standard economic theory assumes that income and cash transfers are always
fungible: any unit of money can be substituted for another and that the source does
not matter for rational consumers. A direct consequence of this is that the labeling
of an income sources alone (cash or cash-equivalents such as vouchers) should not
yield any sizable and statistically significant effect on spending choices. In other
words, standard economic theory would predict that the WFP is seen as income.
When WFP is treated as income, the WFP leads to a rightward shift of the isocost
curve as households can increase the use of both capital and energy to produce more
energy services. This is shown in Figure 1.
However, recent literature shows that cash transfers with a label attached is treated
like a price subsidy to the labeled good. Conceptually, this is a violation of the
fungibility assumption and can be explained by the mental accounting framework
12The household has a budget for all other goods which are abstained from here. The budget constraint
for energy services is a part of overall budget constraint for all goods the household consumes.
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Figure 1: Impact of the WFP as income on use of energy and capital
proposed by Thaler in several works (e.g., Thaler, 1990, 2004). In this framework,
individuals are thought to use simple heuristics to make financial and consumption
decisions. In particular, individuals have mental budgets for different expenditure
categories (food, clothes, and energy) that they treat separately. Which goods fall
into which category (is coffee made at home treated differently than coffee purchased
at a Starbucks, for example) is an open question. La Nauze (2017) finds that house-
holds in Australia disproportionately spend income generated through subsidies to
produce solar power on electricity, another violation of the fungibility assumption.
While La Nauze (2017)’s analysis finds that household-generated electricity and
grid-generated electricity are in the same category , it is uncertain as to whether
renewable energy capital would be treated in the energy category.
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If we assume electricity and renewable energy investments are in the same ac-
count, a labeled cash transfer is used disproportionately more to purchase goods
suggested by the label. Mental accounting would pivot out the isocost curve to allow
more energy to be used as in Figure 2. This result is in line with the findings of
Beatty et al. (2014). In this case, the sign of the effect of the WFP on capital (i.e. re-
newable technologies) depends on the relative strength of the substitution effect and
the output effect. If the substitution effect (towards energy and away from capital)
dominates the output effect, less capital is used and vice versa.14 To summarize, our
simple model predicts that households will reduce their investment in renewable en-
ergy only if the WFP is seen as a price subsidy to energy (and the substitution effect
is stronger than the output effect). This refutable implication is taken to the data to
determine if it has empirical validity.
A number of examples across a number of fields of economics have found ev-
idence of mental accounting. Abeler and Marklein (2017) show that individuals
change consumption according to the suggestion of the label in a field experiment
conducted in a restaurant. Food stamps, a cash-equivalent benefit that can be ex-
changed for food, have also being studied extensively. The results are mixed with
observational studies showing that the fungibility assumption is usually violated,
while experimental evidence would suggest that agents act rationally. Beatty and
Tuttle (2015) shows that an exogenous large increase in food stamp benefits caused
households to increase food-at-home expenditure as well as increase households’
14To reflect the ambiguity of the sign of an energy price subsidy on the level of capital, Figure 2 shows
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Figure 2: Impact of the WFP as a price subsidy to energy on use of energy and capital
share of total expenditure allocated towards food-at-home expenditure. Recent work
found that the cash incentives to education that are labeled, but not conditional on
school attendance, performs as well as more expensive conditional cash transfers in
Morocco (Benhassine et al., 2015). Hastings and Shapiro (2013) provide evidence
that consumers have mental budgets for gasoline such that the income placed in this
budget is not fungible. Beatty et al. (2014) estimate the effect of the WFP on share
of total expenditure spent on fuel, holding total expenditure constant. They find that
non-labeled transfers generally lead to a 3 percent increase in energy expenditures
while the WFP has led to between a 13 and 60 percent increase. No other expenditure
category was significantly affected by receiving the WFP.
The prediction of our model when households use mental accounting implies that
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the WFP label has indirect effects on the renewables market. Should the WFP lead
to less renewable energy investment, it would imply that the label of the WFP leads
households to see a lower price of energy and thus substitute away from renewable
energy and towards more energy that makes pollution. In this scenario, the WFP la-
bel would lead (indirectly) to a socially inefficient outcome, namely an equilibrium in
which a given indoor temperature is obtained with too much pollution. This outcome
is also of concern because indoor temperatures can be kept at comfortable levels by
employing different strategies (or combination of those), some of which are more
socially optimal than just switching the heater on. Some of these alternative strate-
gies include improving energy efficiency and/or installing renewable technologies at
home.
3 Empirical Approach
The eligibility criterion based on age allows for an estimation of the effect of the
WFP on renewable energy installations using a sharp RDD. In other words, assign-
ment to the treatment is determined exogenously by the age of the oldest member
in the qualifying week in September. Thus, households will be either treated by the
WFP if eligible or not treated if not eligible. The empirical specification will then
compare households who are immediately above and below the eligibility age with
the identifying assumption that these households with similar observed and unob-
served characteristics would have behaved similarly with respect to renewable energy
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installation in the absence of the WFP. In other words, this assumption ensures that
households on the left-hand side of the cutoff represent a valid counterfactual and
that the WFP is as “good as randomly assigned” near the discontinuity point (i.e.,
local randomization assumption). Now, let ρ denote the causal effect of WFP on the
probability of renewable energy installment; for small ε > 0 a formal representation
of the causal effect can be given by the following equation:
ρ = lim
ε→0
E(y|x = x0 + ε)− E(y|x = x0 − ε), (1)
where y is a dummy variable indicating whether the household has installed renew-
able technologies at home, x is the age of the oldest member – the assignment vari-
able and x0 is the cut off age of 60 in the qualifying week. Note that this implies that
there are 60 years old who are recipients (born on or before the qualifying week) and
60 years old who are not recipients (born after the qualifying week).
Equation 1 states that any jump in the propensity of renewable energy install-
ment at the threshold can be interpreted as having been caused by the discontinuity
in the WFP, under some specific conditions. The most important condition in our
case is that nothing, other than eligibility to WFP, changes discontinuously around
the threshold age. For households where females are the oldest member, there is
likely to be a discontinuous change in employment status as the pension eligibility
age for females is 60 years of age. Thus, we exclude these households from our
sample. Additional identification concerns are that households which do not own
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their own home are unlikely to be the ones making decisions regarding renewable
energy investments, as they require some alteration to the home’s structure, and that
households with three or more adults may have a decision-making process that is less
likely to be impacted by the receipt of the WFP (a parent living with their children’s
family). To ensure that these issues do not confound the estimation, our sample does
not include households which rent their home and those with three or more adult
members. Further, in order to check for the validity of our design, we will be testing
for the presence of discontinuities in observed covariates, in this case income, em-
ployment status, and educational attainment. The absence of any significant discon-
tinuity will be taken as further reassurance that local randomization is an appropriate
assumption.
Finally, the last condition pertains to the econometric specification and band-
width size. Formally, we can write our econometric model as follows:
y = α+ β1x̃+ · · ·+ βkx̃k + δ1Dx̃+ · · ·+ δkDx̃k + ρD + θT + λZ + η, (2)
where D is the treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 if the household receives
the WFP and 0 otherwise, and x̃ = x–x0 is the normalized age (i.e., centered around
the cutoff) of the older member of the household. To allow for different functional
forms on either side of the cutoff, our model includes interaction terms between the
treatment indicator D and x̃ and its k polynomial orders.15 T is a vector of time
15The normalized age, x̃ = x–x0, gives a guarantee that the coefficient on D is still a causal effect even
after these interactions (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
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dummies that control the survey fixed effects, and Z is a vector of controls which
include (log of) household income, employment status and educational attainment
dummies. If the local randomization generated by the cut off date holds, the inclusion
of controls improves precision only.
The order of the polynomial of x̃ represents the shape of the preferences for
installing renewable energy as age changes. While the assumption is that the prefer-
ences are smooth, this does not provide guidance as to the correct order of polyno-
mial. The optimal polynomial order for the functional form is chosen using the AIC
across different bandwidths.
Equation 2 can be estimated using different windows around the cut off age, i.e.,
bandwidth sizes. Note that as the bandwidth becomes larger, more data is considered,
however households at either end of the spectrum are less likely to have similar ob-
served and unobserved characteristics. Therefore, much wider bandwidths may give
biased results of a causal effect. Narrower bandwidths, on the other hand, may reduce
the precision of the regression model. For this reason, we employ the cross validation
method of optimal bandwidth selection, suggested by Imbens and Lemieux (2008),
which balances between bias and precision. To ensure that the parametric form is not
biasing our results, we also estimate non-parametric locally weighted linear regres-
sions using a triangular and rectangular kernel with narrower bandwidths selected
using the method suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).16
Having established ways of selecting bandwidths and specifications is helpful,
16Triangular kernel assigns more weight to observations around the threshold age. The sensitivity of
these local linear regressions was also assessed by re-estimating at double and half the optimal bandwidths.
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but following the best practices, we do not rely on one particular specification or
bandwidth, because a range of estimations that are stable across different alterna-
tives are more reliable than single sets of estimations. Each table reports the es-
timated coefficient of interest under three bandwidths and parametric models use
three polynomials (linear, quadratic and cubic).17
4 Data
This analysis utilizes repeated cross-sections of a representative sample of UK house-
holds covering the period 2008-2011. The first dataset is the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS) Wave 18. The BHPS is a longitudinal survey covering on average
12,000 individuals and more than 5,000 households from 1991 to 2009, providing
both individual and household-level information on a large variety of variables. Wave
18 is the only wave of the BHPS to ask households about the presence of renewable
technologies at the home in 2008 and 2009. The second dataset is Understanding
Society Survey (USS), which replaced the BHPS, but the first wave did not sample
the same BHPS households. The USS samples more households than the BHPS did
and asks some additional questions, but they are otherwise similar and can be pooled
without any concern. This wave was collected in 2010 and 2011. While these sur-
veys are both constructed as panels, these two waves do not overlap, so that the data
used in the paper is effectively a repeated cross-section.
17Higher order polynomials might mislead the interpretation of results and are not used in the paper, see
Gelman and Imbens (2014).
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Both waves of the BHPS and USS ask each household “Have you installed ...”
solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, solar water heaters or a micro wind turbine. Ideally,
we would have liked to have the exact date of installation of these renewables. How-
ever, other waves of the BHPS and USS do not contain these questions. Our work
therefore assumes that this measure is a good proxy for installation at the time of the
survey. Although not ideal, we believe that this assumption is unlikely to introduce a
bias in the analysis and that, importantly, it is supported by the data. For instance, the
most popular installed renewable in our sample was solar PV and by far the biggest
increase in generation of solar PV came from the years in our sample. According to
data from the Department of Energy and Climate Change, the amount of solar PV
generation in the year before our data (2007) was 1.2 thousand tons of oil equivalent
(toe) while generation in the last year of our sample (2011) was 21 thousand toe.
If anything, using this variable goes against finding a discontinuity at the cut off.
Any jump around the eligibility age would need to be explained by a past behavior
of those (and only those) who are turning 60 in September in each year we analyze
(2008 to 2011). To be detected by our data, this sharp propensity to install renewables
should have been occurred at the end of the 90s by our cohort of 60 years old. This
does not look very plausible. To the best of our knowledge, no such a behavior is
detectable in the past and the data show that the amount of renewables installed by
households in the UK was negligible at the end of the 90s.
Our outcome variable y equals one if any of the three renewable technologies
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have been installed and is zero otherwise.18 Solar PV systems are mounted on roofs
to produce electricity that is either used by the household or exported to the transmis-
sion grid. The generation that is used by the household reduces its expenditure on
energy. According to the Energy Savings Trust, a typical solar PV system will gen-
erate up to 75 percent of a household’s electricity needs. Similar arguments hold for
micro-wind turbines, which can generate up to three times the average household’s
electricity consumption, and solar water heaters, which save around £70 a year.19
Given the eligibility requirement of the WFP discussed above, a sharp RDD re-
quires the assignment variable x be observable. Here, x is the age of the oldest
member of the household during the month of September in the year of the sur-
vey. In other words, not every household in which the oldest male member is 60
is treated. The data provides the month and year of birth as well as the month and
year of the survey. This enables us to compute the age of the oldest member of the
household with extreme precision, i.e., removing any potential measurement error in
x, especially at 60.
Using this data, we construct x in the following way,
18Pr(y = 1|x) is therefore the propensity to invest in renewables.
19There are no subsidy schemes that the authors are aware of that restrict eligibility to 60 and over. The
microrenewable Feed-In Tariffs introduced in 2010 are not based on age. We control for the impact of the
Feed-In Tariffs with year fixed effects. There were two tariffs begun in 2010, a generation tariff and an
export tariff. The generation tariff was a 20 year contract to pay a fixed amount per kWh (depending on
size of the system). The export tariff was 3 pence per kWh (about 1/3 of the retail price of electricity) and




SY −BY if 1 ≤ BM < 9 and 10 ≤ SM ≤ 12
SY −BY − 1 if 1 ≤ BM < 9 and 1 ≤ SM < 9
SY −BY − 1 if 10 ≤ BM ≤ 12 and 1 ≤ SM ≤ 12,
where SY and BY denote survey year and birth year respectively, and SM and
BM denote survey month and birth month respectively. Thus, in the first case, x =
SY −BY if the oldest member of a household was born from January to August and
surveyed from October to December.20 For other combinations of BM and SM ,
we subtract 1 from SY − BY . In the first case, the oldest members aged 60 are
considered as 60, i.e., treated, but in the second and third cases, they are considered
as 59 because they are not eligible for the WFP. The assignment variable, x, is then
used to create a discontinuity dummy, D, which is equal to one if the oldest member
of a household is 60 or older (and thus eligible for the WFP) and is zero otherwise
(e.g. D = 1{x ≥ 60}). 21
To improve sampling variability, some models include the following covariates:
whether the respondent is employed, the log of annual gross household income, and a
set of educational attainment dummies: whether the respondent has obtained higher
20The eligibility criterion for the WFP is that the oldest member of a household turns into 60 before a
given date in September. As the data has no information about day or week of birth, we do not know the
eligibility of households with the oldest members born in September. We drop those households.
21As the take up of the WFP is above 95% according to Beatty et al. (2014), we considerD as a treatment
dummy where 1 implies that a household receives the WFP and 0 otherwise. In this way, we consider the
sharp RDD where the probability of receiving the WFP, Pr(D = 1|x), is sharply discontinuous at 60. A
special release of the 2010 version of the English Housing Survey did include whether the household was in
receipt of the WFP. The correlation of receipt of the WFP and the specification of our discontinuity dummy
D (using age of the oldest member in the qualifying week) was above 98%.
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education, an academic degree, high school advanced qualifications (called A-levels
in UK), standard high school qualifications (called O-levels in UK) and no qual-
ifications. Summary statistics of these variables are available in Table 1 for both
recipients (treated) and non-recipients.22
Table 1: Summary Statistics (bandwidth=10)
Recipients Non-Recipients Difference
Variable Mean N Mean N T-stat P-value
Renewable energy installment 0.015 2363 0.009 1293 -1.61 0.11
Employment (1=yes, 0=no) 0.334 2363 0.821 1293 31.85 0.00
Household size 1.832 2363 1.735 1293 -7.05 0.00
Log of annual household income 8.088 2363 8.366 1293 5.93 0.00
Higher education (1=yes, 0=no) 0.075 2363 0.106 1293 3.20 0.01
Degree (1=yes, 0=no) 0.117 2363 0.148 1293 2.64 0.01
Advanced qualification (1=yes, 0=no) 0.156 2363 0.196 1293 3.01 0.03
Qualification (1=yes, 0=no) 0.234 2363 0.277 1293 2.81 0.01
No qualifications (1=yes, 0=no) 0.416 2363 0.274 1293 -8.64 0.00
Note: This table reports summary statistics of the variables used to estimate the effect of the WFP on
the propensity of renewable energy installment and compare WFP recipients and non-recipients. All the
variables are from wave 18 of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) which covers the year 2008 and
2009, and wave 1 of Understanding Society Survey (USS) for 2010 and 2011. The sample includes home
owners whose household size is two or lower and the oldest member is male with age between 50 and 70
(i.e., bandwidth size of 10).
5 Results
5.1 Main Results
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the estimated effects using a band-
width of 10. Each dot represents the propensity of installing renewable energy tech-
22To test the validity of our identification strategy, we will check for discontinuity of these covariates in
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Figure 3: Graphical representation of discontinuity in the installation of renewables
around the WFP eligibility age
nology, mean of y for a particular age-year (i.e., they are not single observations),
with linear best fit lines through the points on either side of the cut-off. 23 This
provides first evidence that households who are in receipt of the WFP are less likely
to install renewable technologies at home. This is in accordance with the prediction
of our model under the mental accounting framework. The WFP is seen as energy
price subsidy, not as cash income (and substitution effect dominates output effect,
see Figure 2). However, the impact seems to be short-run as the propensity to install
renewables dips after 60 but increases from around age 65.
Table 2 shows the estimated values of ρ from equation (2) under three different
bandwidths (6, 8 and 10), three orders of polynomials (linear, quadratic and cubic)
23The horizontal axis denote the number of years with respect to the WFP receipt. This graph was
obtained using the -biscatter- command written by Michael Stepner for Stata.
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and with and without control variables.24 All models interact the polynomial of age
with the treatment variable to allow for different functional forms on either side of
the discontinuity. According to the Imbens and Lemieux (2008) cross validation
method, the optimal bandwidth is 10 (for details, see Figure A.1 in Appendix).
Standard errors are clustered at age level and corrected for the bias arising from
small clusters as shown by Brewer et al. (2013).25 However, for robustness pur-
poses, Table A.2 in Appendix reports p-values using the wild cluster bootstrapped t-
procedure, with imposition of the null hypothesis for each coefficient, which Cameron
et al. (2008) shown to greatly improve inference with very few clusters.26 The signif-
icance levels reported using these two approaches are identical. Thus we report only
the bias-corrected clustered standard errors because they are less computationally
demanding.
The discontinuity parameters are all negative with estimates that range from 1 to
3.5 percentage points, indicating that the WFP reduces the likelihood of investing in
renewables at home. The inclusion of controls do not change the results – providing
a first indication that the local randomization assumption holds. The estimates in
Table 2 use a linear probability model. Table A.3 runs the same model with a logit
24The optimal polynomial order identified using the AIC is denoted by the subscript letter a. Table A.1
in Appendix reports the values of AIC for each specification.
25These bias-corrected standard errors are computed using the cluster option in Stata. This computes







and critical values from a t distribution with (G−1) degrees of freedom, whereG is the number of clusters,
N is the total number of observations, K is the number of coefficients to be estimated. See Brewer et al.
(2013) for more details.
26p-values from bootstrapped t-statistics were obtained by using the Stata command bootwildct by
Mansi and Scott (2015) and available at http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/6231. The program was down-
loaded in June 2015.
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Table 2: The effect of the WFP on renewable energy installment
Bandwidth
Without controls With controls
Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
10 -0.012** a -0.013* -0.028*** -0.012* a -0.014* -0.030***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007] [0.004]
N=3656 N=3656 N=3656 N=3656 N=3656 N=3656
8 -0.009 a -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.009 -0.024*** -0.025*** a
[0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
N=3074 N=3074 N=3074 N=3074 N=3074 N=3074
6 -0.018** a -0.015*** -0.035*** -0.018** -0.016*** -0.036*** a
[0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.004] [0.005]
N=2411 N=2411 N=2411 N=2411 N=2411 N=2411
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients from sharp RDDs of the propensity to install renewable
technology on an indicator variable for whether the household received the WFP using different polyno-
mials (linear, quadratic and cubic) and bandwidths (6, 8 and 10). Each regression includes year of survey
fixed effects and a series of interactions between the treatment variable and normalized age. The last three
columns include also log of household income, employment and education qualification dummies. See
equation 2 for more detail. The estimation sample includes only home owners whose household size is
two or lower and the oldest member is male. Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering at age
level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The subscript letter a denotes optimal polynomial orders
according to the AIC statistics (see Table A.1). The optimal bandwidth is equal to 10 according to the
cross validation method suggested by Imbens and Lemieux (2008).
specification and finds similar sign and significance. With an eye on robustness we
estimate the same model excluding year 2011, which have few observations. Table
A.4 reports result that confirms the impact of WFP on renewable installations.
As specified above, the basic underlying assumption of the RDD is local random
assignment around the cutoff age of 60 in the qualifying week. One way to check the
validity of the above results is to examine whether the covariates are discontinuous
around that threshold. To test the local randomization, we check discontinuities in
the covariates (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). One may argue that around the WFP el-
igibility age other things change that could be related to the outcome of interest, for
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Table 3: Discontinuities in observed covariates (bandwidth=10)
Discontinuity Standard error
Employment (1=yes, 0=no) -0.008 [0.24]
Heating fuel type (1=gas, 0=others) 0.018 [0.02]
Car Available (1=yes, 0=no) 0.014 [0.02]
Log of annual household income -0.042 [0.05]
Higher education (1=yes, 0=no) -0.013 [0.11]
Degree (1=yes, 0=no) 0.008 [0.01]
Advanced qualifications (1=yes, 0=no) -0.005 [0.01]
Qualifications (1=yes, 0=no) 0.033 [0.02]
No qualifications (1=yes, 0=no) -0.023 [0.02]
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients from seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) of sharp
RDDs of each reported variable on an indicator for whether the household received the WFP using a
bandwidth of 10 and optimal polynomials. Each regression includes the optimal polynomial order of
normalized age (x̃). This varies with each regression. Every model includes year of survey fixed effects
and a series of interactions between the treatment variable and normalized age (x̃). The estimation sample
includes only home owners whose household size is two or lower and the oldest member is male. Standard
errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering at age level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
example employment status.27 Indeed, changes in pension or other benefit eligibility
may alter labor supply decisions.28 In what follows, we check for discontinuity in
the following set of variables: employment status, household size, (log of) annual
household income and a set of education indicators. Every one of these variable is
regressed on the treatment indicator, D, normalized age (x̃), their interactions (Dx̃)
and interactions with polynomials under the optimal bandwidth of 10. Optimal poly-
nomial order varies across different equations. Each regression includes survey year
27Another issue might be whether people have a higher propensity to change homes around the same age.
The dataset provide information concerning the age at which the household moved into their current home.
People are most likely to move into their home at the age of 35 and the propensity falls smoothly as age
increases. A visual inspection of this data reveals no jump in propensity to move around the discontinuity.
Results are not shown but are available upon request.
28In addition to the checks for discontinuity in employment, Blundell et al. (2011) find no evidence of a
discontinuity in male labor supply at the intensive or extensive margin at the cutoff age of 60.
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dummies. As the number of covariates increases, some discontinuities might be sta-
tistically significant by random chance. As suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010),
regression of each covariate is run as seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to per-
form the test of joint discontinuities. Table 3 shows the coefficient of the discontinu-
ity for every covariate. All covariates are not statistically significantly discontinuous
at the cutoff
5.2 Robustness
One may be concerned that households anticipate the receipt of the WFP and alter
their behavior before turning 60. This may cause a “bunching” around the disconti-
nuity which manifests itself as a lack of installation of renewable technologies. This
could potentially bias our estimates. Given that a RDD compares the mean renew-
able technology installation outcome as one approaches the discontinuity from either
side, dropping the discontinuous point should not significantly alter the estimate of
the effect of the discontinuity (Barreca et al., 2011). This is known as the “doughnut
hole” estimation and the results are given in Table 4. All estimates are negative and
most are statistically significant. These estimates lead us to conclude that anticipa-
tion of the WFP is not a concern.
The estimated causal effects shown so far are all from parametric RDDs: lin-
ear, quadratic or cubic. Technically, the linear specification in Table 2 is a (non-
parametric) local linear regression with rectangular kernel, i.e., a function which
gives uniform weight to all observations. Alternatively, one could use triangular ker-
27
Table 4: The effect of the WFP on renewable energy installment excluding age 60
Bandwidth
Without controls With controls
Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
10 -0.016*** -0.018** -0.035*** -0.016** -0.019** -0.037***
[0.005] [0.008] [0.008] [0.006] [0.009] [0.008]
N=3467 N=3467 N=3467 N=3467 N=3467 N=3467
8 -0.012* -0.031*** -0.015 -0.012* -0.032*** -0.017
[0.006] [0.009] [0.011] [0.007] [0.009] [0.013]
N=2885 N=2885 N=2885 N=2885 N=2885 N=2885
6 -0.024*** -0.011 -0.058*** -0.025*** -0.012 -0.061***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.013] [0.008] [0.009] [0.012]
N=2222 N=2222 N=2222 N=2222 N=2222 N=2222
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients from sharp RDDs of the propensity to install renew-
able technology on an indicator variable for whether the household received the WFP using different
polynomials (linear, quadratic and cubic) and bandwidths (6, 8 and 10). Each regression includes year of
survey fixed effects and a series of interactions between the treatment variable and age. The last last three
columns include also log of household income, employment and education qualification dummies. See
equation 2 for more detail. The estimation sample includes only home owners which household’s size
is two or lower and the oldest member is male. Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering at
age level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
nel, a weighting function which gives more “importance” to observations near the
cut off. Further, Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) provide a formula for the optimal
bandwidth that is suggested to be used in the case of local linear regressions. The
method yields an optimal bandwidth of 1.6 (which for simplicity is rounded to 2) and
Table 5 shows local linear regressions with and without covariates using rectangular
and triangular kernel with different bandwidths (the optimal 2, 3 and 4) for robust-
ness purposes. Every estimated coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level and
adding covariates does not make any difference.
To further examine the affect of the WFP, equation 2 is estimated for households
above and below median income. Table 6 show the estimates. The impact of the WFP
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Table 5: Local linear regressions with triangular and rectangular kernels
Bandwidth
Without controls With controls
Triangular Rectangular Triangular Rectangular
4 -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.009*** -0.018***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
3 -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.019***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
2 -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.020*** -0.014***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Note:This table reports the estimated coefficients from local linear RDDs of the propensity to install re-
newable technology on an indicator variable for whether the household received the WFP using triangular
and rectangular kernels and different bandwidths (2, 3 and 4; where 2 is the optimal bandwidth accord-
ing to the method devised by Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012). The first two columns do not include
any control variable, while the third and fourth one includes log of household income, employment and
education qualification dummies. The estimation sample includes only home owners which household’s
size is two or lower and the oldest member is male. Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering
at age level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
is similar in magnitude across the two groups but consistently statistically significant
for the above median households. This result is not driven by a lack of installation of
renewables by below median households. A t-test on the mean difference in installa-
tion between above and below median income households was statistically insignif-
icant (T=1.13). To our knowledge there is little evidence of differential effects of
mental accounting across income groups. This would seem to be a promising avenue
for future research. For now, our model seems to predict more precisely that richer
households – who are less in need of support – are nudged away from cleaner energy
sources, while the effect of WFP has greater variability on poorer households. This
is however potentially good news from a policy perspective: the sacrifice of energy
policy objective in the name of a public health one does not seem to be necessary.
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The implication is to devise a different label that will support the poorer households
without distorting the renewable market for richer households.
Table 6: The effect of the WFP on renewable energy installment by income groups
Bandwidth
Below Median Above Median
Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
10 -0.002 -0.006 -0.038*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.027***
[0.011] [0.016] [0.007] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
N=1862 N=2885 N=2885 N=1794 N=1794 N=1794
8 0.003 -0.024** -0.027** -0.020*** -0.027*** -0.024***
[0.014] [0.011] [0.010] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008]
N= 1532 N= 1532 N=1532 N=1542 N=1542 N=1542
6 -0.011 -0.017* -0.053*** -0.028*** -0.019*** -0.020
[0.013] [0.009] [0.013] [0.005] [0.003] [0.012]
N=1175 N=1175 N=1175 N=1236 N=1236 N=1236
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients from sharp RDDs of the propensity to install renew-
able technology on an indicator variable for whether the household received the WFP using different
polynomials (linear, quadratic and cubic) and bandwidths (6, 8 and 10). Each regression includes year
of survey fixed effects and a series of interactions between the treatment variable and age, log of house-
hold income, employment and education qualification dummies. The estimation sample includes only
home owners which household’s size is two or lower and the oldest member is male. The first three
columns are for household with below median income while the second three columns are for house-
holds above median income. See equation 2 for more detail. Standard errors in brackets are adjusted
for clustering at age level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
5.3 Mechanism and Falsification Tests
To this point, the paper has shown that the WFP generates a significant distortion in
the renewable markets. In this section we provide some evidence that the label is the
mechanism which drives this result, i.e., the label nudges households to think of the
payment as an energy subsidy which move people away from capital towards energy
use.
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A first way to test of the labeling mechanism is to determine whether non-labeled
changes in income affect the probability of installing renewables. Ideally this non-
labeled income would be about the same magnitude as the WFP. The waves of the
BHPS and USS that we used to estimate the impact of the WFP on the probability of
installing renewables, include questions related to extra income, generally described
as income not part of a households usual pay (which both surveys ask about). The
BHPS is more specific about breaking apart these extra income into categories like
lottery winnings or bequests but the USS does not break them apart. The amount
of this extra income is summed across each household and an estimation is run sep-
arately to determine whether the presence of extra income or the amount of extra
income affects the probability of installing renewables 29 The median amount of ex-
tra income in the sample is £184. The results are given in Table 7. All estimates are
indistinguishable from zero.
If the mechanism which drives our results of a reduced propensity to install re-
newable energy technologies is the WFP, and in particular its suggestive label, than
the propensity to make other investments in durable goods on one’s home should
not vary by whether the household receives the WFP. This proposition is tested by
examining whether receipt of the WFP leads to a change in the propensity to in-
vest in non-energy related goods, which costs are similar to the renewable energy
investments considered above. Data from the English Housing Survey for the years
2006-2010 is used to create falsification outcomes which takes the value of one if
29Unfortunately, this test can not tell us how an unlabeled subsidy to renewables would behave and we
do not have a way to test the impact of an unlabeled subsidy.
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Table 7: Effect of Non-labeled income changes on renewable energy installment
Whole Sample Homeowners Aged 50-70
Variable OLS Logit OLS Logit
Presence of Extra Income 0.001 0.001 -2.16e-04 -1.08e-4
[0.001] [0.01] [0.001] [0.002]
N=37,213 N=37,213 N=13,455 N=13,455
Amount of Extra Income 1.82e-09 -2.98e-09 -1.04e-08 -3.92e-08
[2.47e-08] [2.60e-08] [2.43e-08] [6.13e-08]
N=37,213 N=37,213 N=13,455 N=13,455
Note: This table reports the coefficients from an OLS and the marginal effects from a logit model of
the propensity to install renewable technology using two samples. Each regression includes year of
survey fixed effects, age of oldest member, log of household income, and tenure. Standard errors in
brackets are adjusted for clustering at age level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
the household has remodeled their kitchen (replaced units, worktops, and sinks),
installed a burglar alarm, or replaced the gutters in the last 12 months and zero other-
wise. If the WFP leads households to alter their decisions around energy investments
only, the coefficient on receipt of WFP should not statistically alter the propensity to
undertake one of the outcomes listed above. Table 8 shows the estimation results for
equation (2) with first three columns showing the kitchen remodeling estimation, the
second three columns showing the installation of a burglar alarm estimation, and the
third three columns showing gutter replacement estimation.30 The estimated effect
of the WFP in Table 8 is rarely statistically significant and moves from positive to
negative across the different bandwidths and polynomial orders.
30The English Housing Survey (EHS) does not provide the month of birth so the assignment variable
is based on age of the oldest household member at the date of interview. As a result, households whose
oldest member is 59 and interviewed before September and households whose oldest member is 60 and
interviewed after September are removed from the analysis.
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Table 8: Falsification Tests of the Effect of WFP on non-energy goods
Bandwidth
Kitchen Remodelling Installing a Burglar Alarm Replacing Gutters
Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
10 0.015 -0.017 -0.030 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.008 -0.022 -0.032
[0.02] [0.02] [0.04] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03]
8 0.008 -0.031 0.011 0.001 0.001 -0.007 -0.010 -0.025 -0.055**
[0.02] [0.03] [0.05] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
6 -0.005 -0.032 0.075 -0.002 0.003 0.019** -0.016 -0.033 -0.107***
[0.02] [0.04] [0.08] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients from sharp RDDs of the propensity to install the
home upgrade given in each panel on an indicator variable for whether the household received the
WFP using different polynomials (linear, quadratic and cubic) and bandwidths (6, 8 and 10). Each
regression includes the indicated polynomial interactions between the treatment variable and age, log
of household income, employment, education qualification dummies, and year of survey fixed effect.
See equation 2 for more detail. The estimation sample includes only home owners which household’s
size is two or lower and the oldest member is male. The number of observations across all outcomes
are 3298, 2779, and 2185 for bandwidths 10, 8 and 6, respectively. Standard errors in brackets are
adjusted for clustering at age level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Another way to test whether the WFP label is the mechanism behind the reduc-
tion in the probability to install renewable energy is to determine whether there are
any significant discontinuities in the probability of renewable energy installments at
other age levels where receipt of the WFP does not change. If the WFP label is the
mechanism, there should not be a discontinuity at other ages within the bandwith.
Equation (2) is re-estimated with a treatment variable, D, that equals one if the age
of the oldest member of the household is 55, then 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, or 65
in the same qualifying week. This specification will reveal whether a discontinuity in
the propensity to install renewable energy exists at these other placebo cutoff ages,
where households’ eligibility of receiving WFP does not change. Table 9 shows that
most estimates of the discontinuity are statistically insignificant and no consistent
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pattern (i.e., some ages that have a statistically significant estimate has one specifi-
cation that is positive while another is negative). The exception is for a discontinuity
at 61. It is generally negative and statistically significant, though with smaller mag-
nitudes than reported in Table 2. It maybe that households treat the second receipt
of the WFP as extra income, in addition to the first, and by their third time the effect
of the label has been muted due to past experience. Table 9 results are in line with
the WFP being the mechanism that leads to a change in probability to invest in re-
newable energy, as false cutoffs do not find as strong of a discontinuity as the actual
WFP cutoff.
Taken together, these tests offer some support to the claim that the mechanism
behind the change in the propensity to install renewable technologies found in Table
2 is due to the WFP and not a result of income effects or a change in age across the
two groups. Specifically, this constitutes further evidence that the WFP is seen as
price subsidy for energy.
Other possible threats to our identification seem unlikely to compromise the re-
sults. First, the comparison induced by our empirical strategy is not among people
with substantial different ages. There are 60 years old who are recipients and 60
years old who are not recipients depending on whether they are born before or after
the qualifying week in the year in which they turn 60. So our results cannot be ex-
plained by behavior resulting from the simple fact of turning 60 (perhaps a salient
age). We would like to emphasise that the limitation of not knowing the precise
date of installation should not affect our results. The vast majority of renewables
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Table 9: Discontinuities in the probability of renewable energy installment at different
placebo cutoff ages from 55 to 65
Bandwidth=10 Bandwidth=8 Bandwidth=6
Placebo ages Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
55 0.004 0.00 0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.013 -0.001 0.005 0.045***
[0.006] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.008] [0.010] [0.008]
56 0.001 0.007 -0.001 0.005 0.001 0.012 0.003 0.006 -0.001
[0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.005] [0.005] [0.010] [0.006] [0.007] [0.017]
57 0.002 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.008 -0.022**
[0.005] [0.007] [0.008] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.011]
58 0.006 0.012* 0.023** 0.004 0.023** 0.004 0.014*** 0.012 0.004
[0.004] [0.005] [0.010] [0.006] [0.008] [0.006] [0.005] [0.008] [0.010]
59 -0.001 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.009 -0.006 0.008 -0.003 0.012
[0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.010]
61 -0.012** -0.020*** -0.016 -0.014** -0.021** 0.001 -0.018*** -0.014* 0.015*
[0.005] [0.007] [0.010] [0.005] [0.008] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007]
62 -0.008 0.008 0.009 -0.012** 0.000 0.015** -0.007 0.006 0.030***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.006] [0.008] [0.006] [0.009]
63 -0.003 -0.003 0.015* -0.003 0.002 0.013 -0.003 0.011 -0.014**
[0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.005] [0.009] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006]
64 0.003 0.013* 0.017** 0.004 0.019** 0.009 0.009 0.014** -0.006
[0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008]
65 0.006 0.007 -0.005 0.006 0.006 -0.024*** 0.012 -0.012 -0.017**
[0.007] [0.011] [0.010] [0.008] [0.012] [0.008] [0.011] [0.007] [0.008]
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients from sharp RDDs of the propensity to install re-
newable technology on an indicator variable for whether the oldest member of the household is either
above the age indicated using different polynomials (linear, quadratic and cubic) and bandwidths (6, 8
and 10). Each regression includes year of survey fixed effects, the indicated polynomial interactions
between the treatment variable and age, log of household income, employment and education qualifi-
cation dummies. See equation 2 for more detail. The estimation sample includes only home owners
which household’s size is two or lower and the oldest member is male. Standard errors in brackets are
adjusted for clustering at age level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
have been installed in the period covered in this paper. Moreover, given that the
methodology adopted revolves around people with similar ages, the existence of this
discontinuity should have originated sometime in the past but still driven by the date
of birth of the oldest member of the household and used to some years later to deter-
mine eligibility criteria to WFP. We find this implausible.
Second, the results cannot be driven by the general shape of the relationship
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between investments and age as we are testing for a discontinuity in that relationship,
i.e., it does not matter whether investments are increasing, decreasing or flat with age,
as long as there is a jump at the cut off date. Notwithstanding, our analysis shows that
investments of this kind are not declining with age. This is perhaps surprising but is
in line with Browning et al. (2016) who find that durable good consumption is flat or
rising with age using the same dataset. Their paper and our falsification tests show
that other home investments are unaffected by this age cut-off, thus reinforcing the
idea that the drop in renewable energy investment is not due to a “pure” age effect.
Third, Beatty et al. (2014) analysis show that a number of outcomes, such as
changes in expenditures on other household items, are not impacted by receipt of
the WFP and that no change in expenditures are found at other cutoff dates. The
falsification tests which support their analysis also support ours. Though our paper
tests whether a durable good is installed, the repeated cross section nature of the data
ensures that each observation is independent.
Other reasons that may discourage investments in the area are not likely to be
systematically different before and after the cut off age. For example, the price of
solar PV systems generally do not vary based on birth date of homeowner and have
been coming down over time (Feldman et al., 2012). The data utilized come from
a large government survey where interviewers visit the home and which asks about
numerous issues other than energy/environmental issues. As a result, any framing or
reporting concerns seem unlikely and we are not aware of different types of question-
naires being administered around the cut off age. There is evidence of solar panels
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being capitalized into housing prices, but no evidence that the value is different by
age of homeowner (Dastrup et al., 2012). The data show that 83% of households in
our sample use natural gas to heat their home which is similar to the overall sample
average of 82%, thus there is no difference in type of fuel used by household age.
The data show no evidence that households are disproportionately likely to move
when a member is getting close to the age of 60, thus anticipation of a change of
homes are unlikely driving the results. Previous research finds that receipt of gov-
ernment transfers alters household behavior rather than anticipation of the transfer
(Parker et al., 2013 and Attanasio et al., 2012) and the “doughnut hole” estimation
given in Table 4 supports this assertion. This seems to confirm that the distortion
observed in the renewable market comes down to the receipt of the WFP.
One last analysis is to determine whether the mental accounting effect of the
WFP can be nullified by other programs to encourage the use of another energy cap-
ital, installation of loft insulation. As the framework described in Section 2, it is
expected that the WFP would lead to a decrease in the installation of loft insula-
tion. However, loft insulation is often considered the most cost effective method of
improving the energy efficiency of the home and as a result, a number of different
programs were available throughout the sample period to provide free loft insulation
to households. Some programs were run by the local councils and others were part
of the electricity companies required service in programs like the Energy Company
Obligations. Indeed, most respondents, who installed loft insulation, report having
been given a subsidy to make the installation. This outcome is tested using the EHS
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data, the dataset used in Table 8 . Table 10 shows the estimation results for equation
(2) with installation of loft insulation in the last year as an outcome. The first three
columns show the estimation including no controls and the second three columns in-
clude controls. While the coefficient on the WFP dummy is almost always negative,
it is rarely statistically significant. This would imply that it is possible to nullify the
effect of the WFP through programs to encourage the use of energy capital.
Table 10: The effect of the WFP on loft insulation installment
Bandwidth
Without controls With controls
Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
10 0.004 -0.002 -0.033 -0.012 -0.028 -0.067
[0.013] [0.019] [0.033] [0.019] [0.032] [0.051]
N=3222 N=3222 N=3222 N=2271 N=2271 N=2271
8 0.009 -0.015 -0.031 -0.010 -0.038 -0.079
[0.014] [0.018] [0.033] [0.022] [0.035] [0.055]
N=2940 N=2940 N=2940 N=2060 N=2060 N=2060
6 0.03 -0.023 -0.081 *** -0.018 -0.050 -0.196***
[0.015] [0.027] [0.021] [0.025] [0.052] [0.029]
N=2308 N=2308 N=2308 N=1613 N=1613 N=1613
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients from sharp RDDs of the propensity to install
loft insulation given in each panel on an indicator variable for whether the household received the
WFP using different polynomials (linear, quadratic and cubic) and bandwidths (6, 8 and 10). Each
regression includes the indicated polynomial interactions between the treatment variable and age
as well as year of survey fixed effect. Controls include log of household income, employment,
education qualification dummies, and whether a public subsidy was given for the installation of the
loft insulation. See equation 2 for more detail. The estimation sample includes only home owners
which household’s size is two or lower and the oldest member is male. Standard errors in brackets
are adjusted for clustering at age level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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6 Conclusions
Do labels attached to unconditional payments affect decision on related goods? Do
changes in related goods represent negative unintended consequences? While there is
growing evidence building that the label of a cash transfer alters recipients decisions
on purchases of the labeled good, the analysis here is the first to answer the question
above. The answer has broad implications for nearly every policy. Many of the most
common transfers have labels which suggest a use for the transfer.
This paper tests whether households substitute away from renewable energy tech-
nologies, which are more energy efficient, when receiving a cash transfer, the WFP,
which primes them to purchase fuel. Using a simple model of household production
of energy services which can be met by fuel or more efficient capital, it is shown
that when households receive a cash transfer labeled with the word fuel it will lead
to an increase in the amount of fuel used Beatty et al. (2014) but have an ambiguous
impact on whether more energy capital is used.
This theoretical result is confirmed when taken to data. Identification of the
WFP treatment is based on the sharp eligibility criteria of the WFP, confirmation that
other explanatory variables are continuous around the discontinuity, and numerous
falsification tests. In other words, the effect of the WFP is for households to choose
energy sources which pollute more. Results find that the likelihood of investing in
renewable technologies at home decline by 1.2 percentage points after the receipt
of the WFP. This is the estimated value from linear models with bandwidth of 10,
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which statistical tests indicate as optimal. The range of the estimated values go
from 1 to 3.5 percentage points. The results are not only statistically significant,
but also economically relevant. Considering the universality of the transfer, this is
a considerable number. Our models predict that approximately 69% of households
whose oldest member turns 60 would have invested in renewable energy but refrain
to do so after receiving the WFP.31
Given that renewable technologies are one way to ensure that a household can af-
ford to heat its home, these results imply that the label of the transfer nudges house-
holds towards a less socially efficient outcome in which a desired amount of heating
is achieved with more pollution at the expense of cleaner renewable energy install-
ments. Ultimately, the transfer is counterproductive to the ultimate goal of the policy
as it moves households away from one way to achieve the goal itself. Additionally,
concerns over greenhouse gas emissions, energy security, and the competitiveness of
the UK economy, have led to the recent implementation of a number of renewable
energy policies. The evidence given here suggests that the effectiveness of renewable
policies is being hampered by the WFP label. Our analysis shows that this distortion
is more precisely estimated for richer households, which are not in need of support.
This reinforces the argument that a more desirable outcome, one in which energy pol-
icy objective are in harmony with public health ones, is possible. This issue may be
straightforward to remedy; rename the transfer to something that primes the house-
31This number is the difference in the predicted portion of households who would have installed in the
absence of the WFP vs household who installed. It is obtained by running the linear model with controls
and bandwidth=10 in Table 2 (see also equation 2) and then (a) computing the linear predictions at the
cutoff when D=1 (b) computing it when D =0 and then taking the difference.
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Appendix A
Table A.1: Optimal polynomial order selection using the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC)
Bandwidth
Without controls With controls
Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
10 -5438.88 -5437.30 -5435.09 -5443.14 -5441.36 -5439.45
8 -5750.59 -5748.85 -5748.11 -4891.44 -4890.16 -4891.94
6 -4889.58 -4888.13 -4887.79 -4891.44 -4890.16 -4891.94
Note : This table reports the AIC statistics computed for each model presented in Table 2. The
optimal polynomial order is the one with minimum AIC value.
Table A.2: The effect of the WFP on renewable energy installment using wild cluster-
bootstrap (Cameron et al., 2008)
Bandwidth
Without controls With controls
Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
10 -0.012** -0.013* -0.028*** -0.012* -0.014* -0.030***
(0.04) (0.10) (0.00) (0.04) (0.09) (0.00)
N=3656 N=3656 N=3656 N=3656 N=3656 N=3656
8 -0.009 -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.009 -0.024*** -0.025***
(0.24) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00)
N=3074 N=3074 N=3074 N=3074 N=3074 N=3074
6 -0.018** -0.015*** -0.035*** -0.018** -0.016*** -0.036***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N=2411 N=2411 N=2411 N=2411 N=2411 N=2411
Note: This table estimates equation 2 in table 2 using wild cluster bootstrap percentile t-procedure,
imposing the null hypothesis for each coefficient, as shown in (Cameron et al., 2008). P-values ob-
tained from bootstrapped t-stats are shown in parenthesis.
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Table A.3: The effect of WFP on energy renewable instalments – Logit regressions
Bandwidth
Without controls With controls
Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
10 -0.015*** -0.014* -0.032*** -0.015*** -0.016** -0.034***
[0.005] [0.007] [0.008] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008]
N=3656 N=3656 N=3656 N=3656 N=3656 N=3656
8 -0.009 -0.021*** -0.017** -0.010 -0.022*** -0.019**
[0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008]
N=3074 N=3074 N=3074 N=3074 N=3074 N=3074
6 -0.019*** -0.009** -0.029*** -0.020** -0.011*** -0.033***
[0.007] [0.004] [0.010] [0.008] [0.004] [0.008]
N=2411 N=2411 N=2411 N=2411 N=2411 N=2411
Note: This table reports the marginal effects from sharp RDDs of the propensity to install renewable
technology on an indicator variable for whether the household received the WFP using different poly-
nomials (linear, quadratic and cubic) and bandwidths (6, 8 and 10) estimated using logit regressions.
Each regression includes year of survey fixed effects and a series of interactions between the treatment
variable and normalized age. The last three columns include also log of household income, employment
and education qualification dummies. See equation 2 for more detail. The estimation sample includes
only home owners whose household size is two or lower and the oldest member is male. Standard errors
in brackets are adjusted for clustering at age level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.4: The effect of WFP on energy renewable instalments – Excluding 2011
Bandwidth
Without controls With controls
Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
10 -0.012** -0.013* -0.028*** -0.012* -0.014* -0.030***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007] [0.004]
N=3656 N=3656 N=3656 N=3656 N=3656 N=3656
8 -0.009 -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.009 -0.024*** -0.025***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
N=3074 N=3074 N=3074 N=3074 N=3074 N=3074
6 -0.018** -0.015*** -0.035*** -0.018** -0.016*** -0.036***
[0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.004] [0.005]
N=2411 N=2411 N=2411 N=2411 N=2411 N=2411
Note: This table reports the marginal effects from sharp RDDs of the propensity to install renewable
technology on an indicator variable for whether the household received the WFP using different poly-
nomials (linear, quadratic and cubic) and bandwidths (6, 8 and 10). Each regression includes year of
survey fixed effects (excluding year 2011) and a series of interactions between the treatment variable
and normalized age. The last three columns include also log of household income, employment and
education qualification dummies. See equation 2 for more detail. The estimation sample includes only
home owners whose household size is two or lower and the oldest member is male. Standard errors in
brackets are adjusted for clustering at age level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
52


























Figure A.1: Plotting cross validation against bandwidth for choosing the optimal band-
width in Table 2
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